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1 Introduction 
There are a lol 01' argumentation modcls thal have bcen devcloped inside Artificial Intclligencc. Among 
these modcls, differenls formal systems of defeasible argumentation are defined, where argumenls ror 
and against a proposition are produced and evaluated to verify the acceptabilily of that proposition. 
In this manner, defeasiblc argumentation allows reasoning with incomplele and unce11ain information. 
The devclopment of this kind of syslems has grown in the last years [SIM92, BART, KOWA96, AG97, 
DUNG93, DUNGLP] but no consensus has been reached yet on sorne issues, such as thc represcntation 
of argllmcnts, the way they interact, and the output 01' that interaction. Even then, the main idea in these 
syslems is lhat any proposition will be accepted as tme if thcre exist an argument that sllpports il, and 
this argllment is acceptable according to an analysis bctween il and its counterarguments. Therefore, in 
the set of argumcnts of the systcm, sorne 01' them will be \acceptable" or \jllst{fied" arguments, while 
others nol. But this bi-valued classifieation 01" arguments is not cnough, due to sorne situations that 
can be found in argumentation systems. 
The reasons of non-justification can be analyzed in more detail, so we can make a more specific 
classification 01' the non-justified argllments. An argument of this kind can not be justified bccause, 
for instance, it has a justified defcater, 01' it is involved in circular argumentation. In the former, we 
can think that lhe argul1lent has beell cffectivcly defeated. In the lalter, the juslificatioll of the argument 
faUs in an \ inconclusive" state. This is the starting point lo distinguish a third kind uf arguments: 
those which le!'t the dispute without any conclllsion. There exist various names for this argulllents, 
like defendibles, undecided, ambiguolls and undetermined. In the rest 01' the paper, we will call lhis 
arguments uf/decided. There is another reason to classify an argument as undecided. This reasoll IS 
not so obvious as the one specified aboye, and is related to the comparison of argumcnts. 
2 Causes of indecision 
The firsl cause of indccision that we can distinguish is thc presence of controversial situations in 
argumentatiol1, called fallacies. The fallacies are re1ated lo lhe existence of cyclcs in the dcfeats scenario 
011 the set 01' arguments. An argumellts that belong to these cycles used to be called.f(.dlacious ilIgumenl. 
even whcn the fallacy lies on a set 01" arguments. The tel1n fallacy is a very general one [EREASI, and 
sUllle kind of real world I"allacies does nol have useful Illeanings on defeasible argumentatioll. Among 
the most importanl ones, we distinguish circular argumentation, wherc the length 01' the cycle is cvcn, 
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and (,;ontradlctory argumcntation, where the lcngth of the cycle is odd. Every argumcnl in these (,;ycles 
musl be classificd as unuccided, cxcept when therc exists a juslified argumenl who breaks the fallacy. 
defeating at lcast one ru'!,'1lment in the cycle. Actually, no conscnsus has been reachcd on lhe U'calment 
ol' this problems in A11iticial Inlelligence. One approach is implementcd on DeLP, where argumcntation 
Hnes ru'e analyzed in order to delecl cyelcs and to act accordingly. [GCS94, AG97, DCMAJGI 
The second cause of indecision in the system is the existence of incomparable argUrtli'ftts. In 
argumenlation systems, it is necessary lo slale the rclative difl'erence in strength among arguments, by 
means of sorne comparison crileria. AH defcasible logics opcrale by means of a mechanism 01' defeal 
that computes relationships 01' conclusive force among arguments. Defeasible argumenlation systellls 
include a notion 01' contlicling argumenL'i, bul lhis nolion does not embody any form 01' evaluation. 
Evalualing conllkting pairs 01' argumenls is an importanl clement of argumenlalion systems. lt has lhe 
fotn1 01' a binar'y rclalion bctween ru'gumcnts, standing for \ slronger or beller than", usually denoted by 
:::;, so A :::; H mcans \ R is as strong as A" and A < B mcans \ B is stronger than A" 
Mosl popular critcrions ru'c usually bascd on synlactic aspects and they jusI constitute a sU'ucluraI 
anaIysis of the involved ar'gumenls. Many reseru'chers have proposed general criteria for adjudicating 
betwcen compeling lines of ru'guments. Mosl 01' them agree on the principIe of specificity, inlrouuced by 
Poolc in 1985 fPoole851. Other critcria to compare argumenls inelude directness by Loui, preemption 
by Horty el. al., combined defeat by Prakken IPRAK], and accu.mulation of ftumerical strellgth, by 
Pol\ock [Po1941, On the olhcr hand, some authors do not commit to a specilic method lo compare 
arguments. This uttitude saves lhem from lhe responsibility 01' lclling how and why a particular argument 
should overrule any othcr ar'gument. Therefore, these systems work with no detailed specitkatioll 01' 
defeat lDUNG93, VREE97J. Sometimes, lhis kind 01' abstract argumenlation systems fails to capture 
the behavior of some real 1'ull-spccified systems [DCMAJG, DMC99]. 
lt is possible ror two conflieting ru'guments lo be incomparable, according to the selected comparison 
criteria. Two conflieting ar'guments A and B do nol defeal cach olher, except one of thcm is slrongcr, 
according lo thc comparison method. Ir A is slronger than B, lhcn B is dcfeated by A. But, iI' it is 
impossible to statc whkh is the slronger argument, then the direetion of thc eonJlicl relalion can nol be 
detclmined. In this case, neithcr A nor JJ <u'e juslilied and ¡hey are nol really dcfcated by a juslilied 
argument, so we can dassi1'y these argumcnts as \ undecided". lndecision by incomparability is usualIy 
nol considered in defeasible argumenlation systel11s. On De!,].> lAG97 J therc is a dassi Ikalion 01' 
defeaters bascd on comp<u'ison 01' ar'gumcnls, and an ar'gument A is undecided when it is not justilicd 
and at least one defeater is incompar'able lo A. 
The chosen criterion will always have a sU'ong influencc in <u'gul11enl dassitication, bccause il 
detel1uines the direction of the conf1kt rclation, whieh lcads to the defeat relation. On one side, 
the worst eomparison criteria l11akcs an lhe arguments incompru'able, so the systcm faBs in a general 
indccision slate. Howevcr, it is not possible lo (,;onstruct a complete ar'gumenl hierru'chy. And this is 
not a real disadvanlage, because there exists, by nalW'c, incolllpru'ablc arguments in the real world. Any 
criterion thal always adopts a prcference ror any pair 01' ar'guments tends lo be fictitious, bccause 01' 
lhe arbiu'<u'y eont1ict resolution, and il hides lhe possibility (Jf indecision in lhe system, As slated by 
Vreeswijk [VREE97}. incomparability is always better than overspeciiication. 
These two causes 01' indecision are not independent. Actually, the prescncc of cycles is relaled lo 
the detinition of defeal used in the system. And this notion of dcfeat always includes some compar'isoll 
method for ar'guments. A eyele usualIy arises when there ,¡re SOl11e incompar'able argumenls, due lo 
lhe transitivity propC11y of the par'tial order dctenuined by lhe compar'ison method. This is not tme 
when lhe system allows subargument attack. In this case, the arguments bcing compru'ed are the 
subar'gumcnt anu ils dcfealer, so it is possiblc lo construct d cycle where the argumellls involved ar'C 
nol pairwise incompru'uble. Gerard Vreeswijk lVREE97J proposes three conditions to be satisfied by 
any comparison criteria, so lhe defeat as a finite proccss is ensured. To avoid cycles and reciprocal 
defealers, he assumes thal arguments do nol vie with each olher, that ru'guments do not bccamc slrongcr 
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if they are made longer, and there is no loss of conclusive force through su·ict mIes of inference. But 
here, the comparison criteria is not stated explicitly. 
To constmct a method for comparing arguments we neeo a deep knowledge about the logic, the 
structure of mies and arguments, and even the process of justification of the system. And the comparison 
method should be a modular component in argumentation syslems, so we can change the criteria without 
changing the resl of the system. This can be done because thc notion of defcat is oetined in tcrms of 
\ stronger arguments" or \ better arguments" without tclling how this conelusion is reacheo. 
An undecided argument may causc other arguments being undecided too. The rcason is thc jus-
tilication process of an argumcnl A requires knowledge about thc status of lhe relevant argumenls 
01' A. If thc dcfeaters of A are aH of lhem non- justificd argumenls, except one, say D, which is 
undecidcd, lhen A is also an undecidcd argument, because il is impossible to delennine lhe status of 
D as \justified" or \non-justified", and this stalus is needed to determine lhe stalus of A. Thercforc, 
lhe indecision of A is l"Onsequence of lhe indecision of D. This is called \ indecision propagation". 
Thc indecision propagation may be very large, causing other arguments being undecided when al leasl 
one of ils relevanl argumenls is undecidcd. In DeLP, cycles deleclion on justilication process allows 
the minimization of propagation due to the presence of undccidcd argumcnts in the system. 
There exisl, as an alternative, a credulous position about this problem. The propagation can 
be controlled by ignoring undecided relevant arguments dw·ing justification process, so undecidcd 
arguments are only the ~rrguments in a cycle, or non-justified arguments with at least one incomparable 
dcfeatcr. 
Actual works on thcse issucs are rclalcd lo the study of vario LIS argumenl comparison techniques, 
specially the one used un DeLP, the specificity crileria, and lhe constmction of a comparisoll Cl·iteria 
which minimize the presence of fallacies in the system. This criteria could inelude information aboul 
the contexl 01' lhe discussion in which the argumenls take part. In this way, the criterion could obtain 
diffcrent rcsulls in argument comparison, so we can avoid indecision when it is duc to structural equality 
01' the pair of argumenls bcing compared. 
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